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Abstract. The Feistel scheme is an important structure in the block ciphers.
The security of the Feistel scheme is related to distinguishability with a random
permutation. In this paper, efficient quantum algorithms for distinguishing classical
3,4-round and unbalanced Feistel scheme with contracting functions from random
permutation are proposed. Our algorithms realize an exponential speed-up over
classical algorithms for these problems. Furthermore, the method presented in
this paper can also be used to consider unbalanced Feistel schemes with expanding
functions.
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1. Introduction
Many block ciphers algorithms used in cryptography are Feistel schemes(FS), for
example DES, TDES, many AES candidates. Classical (balanced) FS, unbalanced FS
with contracting functions, and unbalanced FS with expanding functions have been
widely studied. The classical security of the Feistel scheme has been considered in terms
of indistinguishability from a random permutation, because the FS is secure against any
chosen-plaintext attack if they are indistinguishable [1, 2].
Luby and Rackoff [3] have shown their famous result: all generic attacks on FS that
more than 3-round require at least O(2n/2) inputs, even for chosen inputs. Moreover,
all the generic attacks on 4-round FS require at least O(2n/2) inputs, even for a stronger
attack that combines chosen inputs and chosen outputs [3]. For 5 round or more the
question is more complicated. In Patarin’s work[1], it was proved that for 5 round or
more the number of queries must be at least O(2n).
It is known that quantum algorithms can be used to realize a sub-exponential
or even exponential speed-up over known classical algorithms for some problems.
Kuwakado[4] showed that quantum algorithms are effective to the 2-round FS and
a variant of 3-round FS. A variant of 3-round FS is distinguishable from a random
permutation(RP) by making O(2n/2) classical queries. However, Kuwakado[4] showed
that O(2n/3) quantum queries are enough for the same task. In this paper, we present
a more effective quantum algorithm for this problem by Simon algorithm[5], the query
complexity here is only O(n). Furthermore, we propose quantum algorithm for 4-round
FS and unbalanced FS with contracting functions. Our quantum query complexity
achieves an exponential speed-up over known classical query algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give a short
overview of the FS and the quantum computation. In section 3, quantum algorithms
to distinguish a variant 3-round FS and a 4-round FS from RP are considered. In
section 4, we present effective algorithm for unbalanced FS with contracting functions.
Conclusions are given in section 5.
2. Background
A Feistel scheme(FS) from {0, 1}N to {0, 1}N with r -round is a permutation structured
by round functions. When these functions are randomly chosen, we get what is called
a ”random FS”. The attacks on these “random FS” are called “generic attacks” since
these attacks are valid for most of the round functions f1. . . fr. For most of classical FS,
we have N = 2n and the round functions fi are from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}n. Such schemes
are called ”balanced” FS.
Unbalanced Feistel Scheme: An unbalanced FS Gdk with contracting functions
is a FS with d rounds. On some input [I1, I2, ...Ik], Gdk produces an output denoted
by [S1, S2, ...Sk] by going through d rounds, where I i, Si ∈ {0, 1}N , (1 ≤ i ≤ k). The
round function fj at round j is a function from (k − 1)n bits to n bits. At each round,
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the last (k − 1)n bits of the round entry are used as an input to the round function
fj , which produces n bits. Those bits are xored to the first n bits of the round entry.
Finally before going to round j + 1, the kn bit value is rotated by n bits.
The first round of Gdk is represented in Fig1 below.
Fig1. First Round of Gdk
To demonstrate the superior computational ability in quantum computers, many
distinguishing problems have been studied. Most of the known results showing that
quantum computers outperform their classical counterparts can be phrased as black-
box problems. A black-box(oracle) is subroutine that implements some operation or
function. It provides no other information other than taking an input and giving
the prescribed output. Quantum computers can offer superpolynomial speedups over
classical computers, but only for certain ”structured” problems. The key question is
whether we can find the ”structured” for the certain task.
FS and RP Distinguishing problem: Giving an oracle C and promising that
C is either the r -round FS or RP. The problem is to determine whether C is FS or RP
by making queries to the oracle C with a complexity as small as possible.
Query complexity [6]: When referring to a black-box algorithm, the query
complexity is the number of applications of the black-box or oracle used by the
algorithm. When referring to a black-box problem, the query complexity is the number
of applications of the black-box required by any algorithm to solve the problem.
Notations
We will use the following notations in this paper.
In = {0, 1}n is the set of the binary strings of length n. Particularly, 0 is n–bits
zero vector.
For a,b ∈ In, a⊕ b stands for bit by bit exclusive of a and b.
The set of all function from In to In is Fn.
Let f is a function of Fn. Let a, b be elements of In. Then by definition:
FS(f)[a,b] = [b, a⊕ f(b)].
Let f1, ...fr be r functions of Fn. Then by definition:
FSr(f1, ...fr) = FS(fr) ◦ ... ◦ FS(f1), where ◦ is the composition of functions.
FSr(f1, ...fr) is called ”a FS with r -round”.
Gdk is a d rounds unbalanced FS with contracting functions.
Furthermore, we denote Feistel scheme and random permutation by FS and RP
respectively.
Quantum Generic Attacks on Feistel Schemes 4
3. Quantum Attack on Classical Feistel scheme
3.1. Attack on The variant 3-round FS
This section shows that quantum algorithm can make less queries to distinguish a
variant of the 3-round Feistel scheme VFS from a RP. The variant considered here
is the 3-round FS such that the second internal function f2 is replaced with a RP
on {0, 1}n. Kuwakado[4] showed that a VFS is distinguishable from a RP by making
O(2n/3) quantum queries. However, in this section, we will propose a quantum algorithm
to distinguish a VFS with less queries. This distinguishing attack is similar to Simon’s
algorithm[5].
————————————————————————
Algorithm 1
————————————————————————
Input: An oracle C that is promised to be either VFS or RP. A constant
q ≥ ⌈− log3 ε⌉.
Output: Oracle C is VFS or RP with success probability 1− ε.
Let k = 1.
1) While k < q do
2) For t from 1 to n+ 5 do
3) Prepare the 4n qubit state
∑2n−1
i=0 |i〉1 |0〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4.
4) Apply UC to create the state
∑2n−1
i=0 |i〉1 |0〉2 |ci〉3 |di〉4.
Where UC |i〉1 |0〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4 = |i〉1 |0〉2 |ci〉3 |di〉4, i.e. C(i, 0) = (ci,di) .
5) Measure the fourth register, and then apply UC again to “uncompute” the value
of function from the third and the fourth registers; we have a random “coset state”
1√
2
(|i〉+ |j〉) in the first register. Let s = i⊕ j and K = {0, s}.
6) Apply a Hadamard gate to the first register, the state in the first register is∑
y∈K⊥ (−1)y·i |y〉, where normalization factor has been omitted.
7) Measure the first register to obtain a string yt ∈ {0, 1}n; t = t + 1.
8) Let M be the (n + 5) × n matrix whose t-th row is the vector yt. Solve the
system Mxk = 0; k = k + 1.
9) For 1 ≤ k ≤ q, if xk = 0 holds, then output “VFS”, otherwise, output “RP”.
————————————————————————
Correctness: After applying the Hadamard gates in step 6, the ”coset state”
1√
2
(|i〉 + |j〉) gets mapped to ∑y∈K⊥ (−1)y·i |y〉, where K⊥ = {y|y ∈ Zn2 ,y · s = 0}
and normalization factor has been omitted. Thus, with n+5 random samples from K⊥,
the samples vectors yt will generated K
⊥ with probability exponentially close to one.
Then, we can efficiently compute generators for K by Gaussian elimination, i.e. we can
determine whether i⊕ j = 0 holds.
Suppose that C is VFS. Since the second internal function is a random permutation,
the value of the first and the fourth register is one-to-one, so the equality i⊕j = 0 always
holds; Suppose that C is RP. Since the right part of RP(i, 00...0) is a random binary
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strings of length n, then the number of |i〉 that map to the same value |bi〉 in the fourth
register is two on average. So i⊕ j 6= 0 holds with high probability.
Sometimes, for a RP, we will obtain only one or three(or more) different i in the
first register that map to the same value d in the fourth register. In this case, we will
also get the zero solution to the system Mxk = 0, the probability will be considered
later.
Query complexity: If C is RP, then the value |i〉 in the first register and |di〉 in the
fourth register is two-to-one in general, particularly, we take the probability is 2/3, i.e.
the error probability of algorithm 1 can be evaluated as follows:
Perr = Pr[VFS|RP]Pr[RP] + Pr[RP|VFS] Pr[VFS]
≤
(
1
3
)q · 1
2
+ 0 · 1
2
≈ 3−q .
Perr ≤ ε, so we have q ≥ − log3 ε.
Furthermore, to solve the systemMxk = 0, we need only O(n
3) elementary classical
operations. So the above algorithm makes O(2q ∗ (n+5)) ≈ O(n) quantum queries and
O(n) elementary quantum operations and O(n3) classical operations.
Theorem 1 Given an oracle C that is promised to be either VFS or RP, there is
a quantum algorithm to distinguish VFS from RP with O(n) quantum queries.
Proof. The result is obviously from the above analysis.
3.2. Attack on The 4-round Feistel scheme
Let C = FS4(f1, f2, f3, f4) is a 4-round FS, where C(a,b) = (c,d) . In Patarin’s work[1],
for a RP, the number N of (i, j), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m such that bi = bj and ci⊕ ai = cj ⊕ aj
is m
2
2·22n . However, for a FS
4(f1, f2, f3, f4), the number N is
m2
22n
. So we take all ai ∈ In,
bi = 0 and count the number N of equalities of the form ci⊕ai = cj⊕aj , i < j. So for
a RP N ≈ 2n−1, and for a FS4(f1, f2, f3, f4) we have N ≈ 2n. Then, given c⊕a ∈ In, for
a RP the number of ai ∈ In such that C(ai, 0)⊕ (ai, 0) = (ci ⊕ ai,di ⊕ 0) = (c⊕ a,di)
is 2 on average. However, for a 4-round FS, the number is 3 on average.
Now a quantum algorithm to distinguish 4-round FS from RP will be proposed.
————————————————————————
Algorithm 2
————————————————————————
Input: An oracle C that is promised to be either 4-round FS or RP. A constant
q ≥ ⌈−20 log3 ε⌉.
Output: Oracle C is 4-round FS or RP with success probability 1− ε.
Let k = 1.
1) While k < q do
2) For t from 1 to n+ 5 do
3) Prepare the 4n qubit state
∑2n−1
i=0 |i〉1 |0〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4.
4) Apply UC to create the state
∑2n−1
i=0 |i〉1 |0〉2 |ci〉3 |di〉4.
Where UC |i〉1 |0〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4 = |i〉1 |0〉2 |ci〉3 |di〉4.
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5) Apply UD to create the state
∑2n−1
i=0 |i〉1 |0〉2 |i⊕ ci〉3 |di〉4,
Where UD |i〉1 |0〉2 |ci〉3 |di〉4 = |i〉1 |0〉2 |i⊕ ci〉3 |di〉4
6) Measure the third register, apply UD and UC again, then we have a random
“coset state” 1√
2
(|i〉+ |j〉) or 1√
3
(|i〉+ |j〉+ |k〉) in the first register.
7) Call step 6 to step 8 of Algorithm 1.
8) Denote xk = 1 if xk 6= 0, else xk = 0. Determine the oracle C is 4-round FS or
RP through binary sequence x = (x1, ...xq).
————————————————————————
Correctness: The distribution of a secure FS should be smooth, i.e., for given
c⊕a ∈ In, the number of ai ∈ In such that C(ai, 0)⊕(ai, 0) = (c⊕a,di) is 3 in general.
So, for simplicity, we take the probability for 2/3. Note that xi = 1 if the number is 2,
and xi = 0 if the number is 3. Suppose that C is RP then the equality xi = 1 holds with
probability at least 2/3, however, the probability is at most 1/3 for 4-round FS. Denote
the number of xi = 0 and xi = 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ q) in the sequence x is N0, N1, respectively.
So if N1 > N0, we consider that C is RP, otherwise, C is FS.
Query complexity: By the analysis above, the error probability is evaluated as
follows:
Perr = Pr[VFS|RP]Pr[RP] + Pr[RP|VFS] Pr[VFS]
= 3−q[C0q + C
1
q · 2 + C2q · 22 + ...Crq · 2r]
≤ 2r
3q
[C0q + C
1
q + C
2
q + ...C
r
q ] ≤ 2
3r
32r+1
Perr ≤ ε, so we have r ≥ log3 ε3 log3 2−2 ≈ −10 log3 ε, i.e. q ≥ −20 log3 ε.
Furthermore, to solve the systemMxk = 0, we need only O(n
3) elementary classical
operations.
The above algorithm makes O(q ∗ (n + 5)) ≈ O(rn) quantum queries and O(rn)
elementary quantum operations and O(rn3) classical operations.
Theorem 2 Given an oracle C that is promised to be either 4-round FS or RP,
there is a quantum algorithm to distinguish FS from RP with O(n) quantum queries.
The result is obviously from the above analysis. Patarin[1][2] showed that to
distinguish 4-round FS from RP, classical generic attack required O(2n/2) random queries
and O(2n/2) computations. So quantum algorithm here realizes an exponential speed-up.
4. Unbalanced FS with contracting functions
4.1. Attacks on 4-round:G43
On some input [I1, I2, I3], G43 produces an output denoted by [S
1, S2, S3]. We choose
m messages such that ∀i, I3i = 0 and I2i 6= I2j for all i 6= j, where I1i , I2i , I3i ∈ In.
Then count the number N of pairs (i, j ) with i < j such that I2i ⊕ I2j = S1i ⊕ S1j .
For a RP, this condition appears only by chance. Thus, from Patarin’s work[7], we
getN ≈ m2
2n+1
+σ
(
m
2n/2
)
, where σ
(
m
2n/2
)
denotes the standard deviation. For G43 we have
N ≈ m2
2n
+ σ
(
m
2n/2
)
. So take m = 2n, for a RP N ≈ 2n−1, and for G43 we have N ≈ 2n.
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So we can obtain an effective algorithm to distinguish G43 from RP.
————————————————————————
Algorithm 3
————————————————————————
Input: An oracle C that is promised to be either G43 or RP. A constant
q ≥ ⌈−20 log3 ε⌉.
Output: Oracle C is G43 or RP with success probability 1− ε.
Let k = 1.
1) While k < q do
2) For t from 1 to n+ 5 do
3) Prepare the 4n qubit state
∑2n−1
i=0 |0〉1 |i〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4 |0〉5 |0〉6.
4) Apply UC to create the state
∑2n−1
i=0 |0〉1 |i〉2 |0〉3 |S1i 〉4 |S2i 〉5 |S3i 〉6.
Where UC |0〉1 |i〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4 |0〉5 |0〉6 = |0〉1 |i〉2 |0〉3 |S1i 〉4 |S2i 〉5 |S3i 〉6.
5) Apply UD to create the state,
∑2n−1
i=0 |0〉1 |i〉2 |0〉3 |i⊕ S1i 〉4 |S2i 〉5 |S3i 〉6
Where UD |0〉1 |i〉2 |0〉3 |S1i 〉4 |S2i 〉5 |S3i 〉6 = |0〉1 |i〉2 |0〉3 |i⊕ S1i 〉4 |S2i 〉5 |S3i 〉6
6) Measure the fourth register, apply UD and UC again, then we have a random
“coset state” 1√
2
(|i〉+ |j〉) or 1√
3
(|i〉+ |j〉+ |k〉) in the second register.
7) Call step 6 to step 8 of Algorithm 1.
8) Denote xk = 1 if xk 6= 0, else xk = 0. Determine the oracle C is G43 or RP
through binary sequence x = (x1, ...xq).
————————————————————————
Correctness: The equality I2i ⊕I2j = S1i ⊕S1j holds if and only if I2i ⊕S1i = I2j ⊕S1j holds.
So by measuring the fourth register, applying UD and UC again, we have a random
“coset state”
1√
2
(|i〉+ |j〉) (1)
or
1√
2
(|i〉+ |j〉+ |k〉) (2)
in the second register.
We know that xk = 1 if equality (1) holds, and xk = 0 if equality (2) holds. Similarly
algorithm 2, if the oracle C is G43, then xk = 1 with probability at most 1/3, however,
the probability at least 2/3 for a RP. So it will be enough to distinguish G43 from RP
by the observed sequence x.
Query complexity: The complexity is similar to algorithm 2. By the analysis of
algorithm 2, the error probability is evaluated as follows:
Perr = Pr[VFS|RP]Pr[RP] + Pr[RP|VFS] Pr[VFS] ≤ 2
3r
32r+1
Perr ≤ ε, so we have r ≥ log3 ε3 log3 2−2 ≈ −10 log3 ε, i.e. q ≥ −20 log3 ε.
Furthermore, to solve the systemMxk = 0, we need only O(n
3) elementary classical
operations.
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Theorem 3 Given an oracle C that is promised to be either G43 or RP, there is a
quantum algorithm to distinguish G43 from RP with O(−10n log3 ε) quantum queries.
4.2. Attacks for k+1 round with k≥4
The input and output of Gdk is denoted by [I
1, I2, ...Ik] and [S1, S2, ...Sk], respectively.
For Gk+1k , we choose ∀i, I3i = ... = Iki = 0 and pairwise distinct I1i . Then from
Patarin’s work[7], if we take all I1i ∈ In, the number N of pairs (i, j ), i < j, such that
I2i ⊕ I2j = S1i ⊕ S1j holds is 2n. However, for a RP, we have N ≈ 2n−1.
So we can obtain an algorithm similar algorithm 3.
It is enough to substitute step 3 to step 6 in algorithm 3 as follows:
3*) Prepare the 2kn qubit state
∑2n−1
i=0 |i〉1 |0〉2 ... |0〉k ... |0〉2k.
4*) Apply UC to create the state
∑2n−1
i=0 |i〉1 |0〉2 ... |0〉k |S1i 〉k+1 ...
∣∣∣Ski
〉
2k
,
where UC |i〉1 |0〉2 ... |0〉k ... |0〉2k = |i〉1 |0〉2 ... |0〉k |S1i 〉k+1 ...
∣∣∣Ski
〉
2k
5*) Measure the (k+1)-th register, apply UC again, then we have a random “coset
state” 1√
2
(|i〉+ |j〉) or 1√
3
(|i〉+ |j〉+ |k〉) in the first register.
The correctness and query complexity is obviously from algorithm 3, we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 4 Given an oracle C that is promised to be either Gk+1k or RP, there is
a quantum algorithm to distinguish Gk+1k from RP with O(n) quantum queries.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented quantum generic attacks against classical FS. We shows that
the 3,4-round FS and unbalanced FS with contracting functions Gdk are distinguishable
from a RP by making less queries than classical queries. Moreover, the method in this
paper can also be used to distinguish unbalanced FS with expanding functions.
Here we will discuss a few more open problems. The main problem is that we
haven’t considered the more round FS. For 6 round or more, it is still an open problem
whether or not the number of quantum queries can achieve exponential speed-up over
classical queries. Furthermore, finding another scheme used in classical cryptography
which realizes speed-up by quantum algorithm is more challengingly.
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